Matrix Blog

New York Times

[Glaeser 2-fer] Cities Do It Better + Manhattan Preservation Follies

April 28, 2010 | 10:21 am | |

I’m a big fan of the work of Harvard Economics Professor Edward Glaeser‘s work, especially that related to Manhattan. This week we are hit broadside with two compelling pieces to read.


[click image to open article]

The first is yesterday’s Cities Do It Better article in the NYT Economix section where he asks the question:

What makes dense megacities like New York so successful?

Economic geography was one of my favorite courses in college because it was so applicable to understanding the logic of how a city evolved and operated. Access to natural resources, transportion, labor, etc. He references Jed Kolko’s essay in “Agglomeration Economics” that he edited.

A key point as far as I’m concerned:

In a multi-industry city, like New York, workers could readily find some other employer. The young Chester Carlson was laid off from Bell Labs during the Great Depression, then moved to a law office as a patent clerk and then joined the electronics company that would make Duracell batteries and then invented the Xerox copier.

It’s sort of like my assumption that it is much more likely you will run into someone you know from another state or went to high school with in Manhattan than you would if you lived a mid-sized city. High density brings opportunity.

But there is more risk in cities like Detroit whose economy has always been one-dimensional. Pittsburgh and Houston are examples of smaller cities that learned to diversify after hovering near insolvency in prior decades.


[click image to open article]

His second article was released in City Journal called Preservation Follies which warns against excessive landmarking which serves to make Manhattan less affordable. He’s not anti-preservation, but he makes a case for excessive landmarking which has including buildings that don’t deserve it. His approach was novel to me, in the way that he tracks acres as the metric of landmarking:

He also looks at the addition of housing units within landmark districts:

During the 1980s, the mostly historic tracts added an average of 48 housing units apiece—noticeably fewer than the 280 units added in the partly historic tracts and the 258 units added in the nonhistoric tracts. In the 1990s, the mostly historic tracts lost an average of 94 housing units (thanks to unit consolidation or conversion to other uses), while the partly historic tracts lost an average of 46 units and the nonhistoric tracts added an average of 89 units.

…and its impact on housing prices…

From 1980 through 1991, the average price of a midsize condominium (between 800 and 1,200 square feet) sold in a historic district was $494,043 in today’s dollars. From 1991 through 2002, that price was $582,671—an 18 percent increase. The average price of a midsize condo outside a historic district, meanwhile, barely rose in real dollars, from $581,865 in the first decade to just $583,352 in the second.



[Public Speaking] VU2010 Moving Forward: The State of the New York Real Estate Market

April 26, 2010 | 8:44 am | | Public |

Tomorrow morning, I get to be the keynote speaker for this event – a brief presentation. Vivian Marino of the New York Times and her distinguished panel gets to do the heavy lifting. Online registration is here.



[WAMU Irregularity] Placing Turf Wars Ahead of Common Sense

April 12, 2010 | 3:39 pm | |

Sewell Chan writes an excellent article in today’s NYT: “U.S. Faults Regulators Over a Bank” which illustrates the regulatory disfunction and conflict of interest that lead to the financial meltdown.

In fact, in our firm’s experience as an appraiser doing work for Washington Mutual during their run-up, you’d have to be blind not to see the conflicts and the loss of a sense of risk. The appraisal departments were the last bastion of neutrality in the organization to protect appraisers from pressure by loan officers and they were eventually closed as “cost centers.” Nearly two years to the day that WAMU closed their in house appraisal departments and went with Appraisal Management Companies, they became insolvent.

The two agencies that oversaw Washington Mutual, the investigation found, feuded so much that they could not even agree to deem the company “unsafe and unsound” until Sept. 18, 2008.

And one had an operational incentive:

With more than $300 billion in assets, WaMu was the largest institution regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision and accounted for as much as 15 percent of its total revenue from assessments, the report found.

In 2004, while property values were rising at double-digit rates, I remember thinking that my firm would be “out of business” in 3 years if we continued to keep our majority of client base with large retail banks because most were pursuing high risk lending strategies. This meant high-ball appraisal values and little concern about borrowers ability to pay – firms like ours simply didn’t fit in. Frustrated with the insanity of all this, I eventually started up blogging in 2005 – the timing in this article as outlined in the treasury report framed the WAMU debacle perfectly.

The report found that Washington Mutual had failed primarily “because of management’s pursuit of a high-risk lending strategy that included liberal underwriting standards and inadequate risk controls.” The strategy accelerated in 2005 and came to a crashing end in 2007 with the drop in the housing market.

Here are a few simple takeaways that should be considered in all forms of financial regulation.

  • Regulators need clearly defined lines of authority – turf wars between all agencies were a distraction – politics not allowed.
  • Regulators can not be specifically dependent on income derived from the institutions they regulate – an amazingly large conflict.
  • Institutions can not select which agency they wish to be regulated by – wow, common sense.


Tags:


[HVCC and AMCs Violate RESPA?] Here’s a possible solution

March 16, 2010 | 12:01 am | |

I was provided an interesting solution to the AMC appraisal issue from Tony Pistilli, a certified residential appraiser who has been employed for over 25 years in the appraisal area, at governmental agencies, mortgage companies, banks and has been self employed.

He wants appraisers to get the word out. His solution is compelling.

Anyone who reads Matrix knows what I think of the Appraisal Management Company and the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) problem in today’s mortgage lending world.

Here’s a summary of the his article before you read it:

  • Appraisers, Realtors, Brokers HATE the HVCC.
  • AMC’s and Banks LOVE the HVCC.
  • Regulators are disconnected from the problem just like they were when mortgage brokers controlled the ordering of appraisals during the credit boom.
  • Appraisers and borrowers are paying for services the banks receive.
  • Banks should pay for the services received from the AMC’s.
  • Appraiser’s fees should be market driven.
  • Banks should be held accountable for the quality of the appraisal.

AMC/HVCC appears to violate RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) since a large portion of the appraisal fee is actually going for something else coming off the market rate fee of the appraiser.

(RESPA) was created because various companies associated with the buying and selling of real estate, such as lenders, realtors, construction companies and title insurance companies were often engaging in providing undisclosed Kickbacks to each other, inflating the costs of real estate transactions and obscuring price competition by facilitating bait-and-switch tactics.

The Ultimate Solution for the Appraisal Industry

by Tony Pistilli, Certified Residential Appraiser and Vice-Chair, Minnesota Department of Commerce, Real Estate Appraiser Advisory Board, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Since the inception of the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) in May 2009, there has been much discussion, and misinformation, about the benefits and harm caused by the controversial agreement with the New York Attorney Generals office and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. This agreement, originally made with the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to only accept appraisals ordered from parties independent to the loan production process. Essentially, this means, anyone that may get paid by a successful closing of the loan cannot order the appraisal.

In the past 6 months while the Realtors© and Mortgage Brokers associations point fingers at appraisal management companies for their use of incompetent appraisers who don’t understand the local markets, appraisers are complaining that banks are abdicating their regulatory requirements to obtain credible appraisals by forcing them to go through appraisal management companies at half of their normal fee.

Banking regulations allow banks to utilize the services of third party providers like appraisal management companies, but ultimately hold the bank accountable for the quality of the appraisal. Unfortunately, the banking regulators have yet to express a concern that there is a problem with the current situation.

I need to state that appraisal management companies can provide a valuable service to the lending industry by ordering appraisals, managing a panel of appraisers, performing quality reviews of the appraisals, etc. However, banks have been enticed by appraisal management companies to turn over their responsibility for ordering appraisals with arrangements that ultimately do not cost them anything.

The arrangement works like this, the bank collects a fee for the appraisal from the borrower; orders an appraisal from the appraisal management company who in turn assigns the appraisal to be done by an independent appraiser or appraisal company. During this process the appraisal fee paid by the borrower gets paid to the appraisal management company who retains approximately 40% to 50% and pays the appraiser the remainder. So for the $400 appraisal fee being charged to the borrower, the appraiser is actually being paid $160-$200 for the appraisal. Absent an appraisal management company the reasonable and customary fee for the appraisers service would be $400, not the $160 to $200 currently being paid to appraisers.

Rules within the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) have allowed this situation to occur, despite prohibitions against receiving unearned fees, kickbacks and the marking up of third party services, like appraisals. RESPA clearly states, “Payments in excess of the reasonable value of goods provided or services rendered are considered kickbacks”.

Banks are allowed to collect a loan origination fee. This fee is intended to cover the costs of the bank related to underwriting and approving a loan. Ordering and reviewing an appraisal is certainly a part of that process. Understanding that banks ultimately have the regulatory requirement to obtain the appraisal for their lending functions, why is it that borrowers and appraisers are paying for these services that are outsourced to appraisal management companies? Does the borrower benefit from a bank hiring an appraisal management company? Does an appraiser benefit from a bank hiring an appraisal management company? The answer to those two questions is a very resounding, no! Clearly the only one in the equation that benefits is the bank, so why shouldn’t the banks be required to pay for the outsourcing of the appraisal ordering and review process?

It is here where I believe the solution for the appraisal industry exists. Since banks are the obvious benefactor from the appraisal management company services, the regulators should require that the banks, not the borrowers or appraisers, pay for the services received. This one small change in the current business model would allow appraisers to receive a reasonable fee for their services and in turn they should be held more accountable for the quality and credibility of the appraisals they perform. Appraisal fees would be competitive among appraisers in their local markets, much like the professional fees charged by accountants, attorneys, dentists and doctors. Appraisal management companies would suddenly be thrust into a more competitive situation where their services can be itemized and their quality and price be compared to those of competing providers. This will ultimately lead to lower fees and improved quality of services to the banks. The banks will then have a very quantifiable choice, do they continue to outsource their obligations to an appraisal management company and pay for those services or do they create an internal structure to manage the appraisal ordering and review process? Either way, the banking regulators need to hold the banks more accountable at the end of the process.

When all of the previously discussed elements are present, I believe the appraisal industry will be functioning the way it was intended. Appraisal independence will be enhanced and borrowers will be rewarded with greater quality and reliability in the appraisal process. This is exactly the change that is needed, in addition to the HVCC, to stop the current finger pointing and address the poor quality and non-independent appraisals that have been and are still rampant in the industry.


Tags: , , , , , ,


[New Mortgage Program] Getting Paid To Sell Short

March 8, 2010 | 10:40 am | |

The Obama administration has come up with a radically aggressive plan to reduce foreclosure activity which has remained alarmingly high. The key ingredient is to encourage lenders/services to allow more short sales – selling the home for less than the amount of the mortgage without going after the debtor for the shortfall. Mortgage modification plans have not been successful to date.

The New York Times page 1 story today Program Will Pay Homeowners to Sell at a Loss does a masterful job in presenting the program and summarizing the problems of the issue to date, I just wish the title wasn’t so simplistic.

Perhaps I am missing the point, but I feel like this solution has focused on the wrong side of the mortgage default equation. Are servicers going to forgive $200,000 in principal to get $1,000? Are homeowners going to move forward because they get $1,500 (more than the servicer) in relocation fees?

The flood of short sale requests are already overloading many bank’s ability to handle the administration of this crisis – hard to see them able to manage the process any more efficiently.

However, the only way out of this crisis is a solution with principal foregiveness in the equation or people will simply walk away and perhaps the servicer/lender ends up being hurt more. No easy answer I suppose.

Real estate agents will determine property value

One mechanical aspect of this process which demonstrates the administration’s and government in general’s disconnect in the need for neutral analysis of value. Real estate agents, who are paid to sell property, determine the “reserve” price above which the lender/servicer must adhere to.

Under the new federal program, a lender will use real estate agents to determine the value of a home and thus the minimum to accept. This figure will not be shared with the owner, but if an offer comes in that is equal to or higher than this amount, the lender must take it.

Mr. Paul, the Phoenix agent, was skeptical. “In a perfect world, this would work,” he said. “But because estimates of value are inherently subjective, it won’t. The banks don’t want to sell at a discount.”

How about a neutral party in the process? A qualified appraiser? (not the yahoos doing AMC work in high volume). I would assume the agents selecting the number are not allowed to sell the property (huge assumption on my part) but why not have someone who can’t ever sell the property, whose full time job it is to estimate market value, be assigned that task?

The devil is in the details.


Tags: ,


Why Banks Aren’t Going To Ease Mortgage Underwriting Anytime Soon

March 2, 2010 | 9:56 pm | |

Source: NY Times [click to expand]

Floyd Norris’ Off The Charts column “Banks Out of the Woods? Maybe Not” had some sobering news from the FDIC.

  • $1 of $8 in outstanding 1-family mortgage loans is to a troubled borrower.
  • 40% of 1-family residential construction loans delinquent or uncollectible.
  • Number of outstanding loans falling, even after adjusting for write offs.
  • 2.9% of loans written off in 2009, highest rate in FDIC history.

Some good news?

  • Fewer loans are going bad – 30-89 day loan arrears falling

However this good news may be misleading – a regulatory change allows banks to only write down the exposure.


Tags:


Wall Street Bonus Money Flows Like Molasses

March 2, 2010 | 1:49 pm | |

Note to readers – Matrix was hacked and we moved to a new host. Lost some of the graphics as a result – will get back on track shortly.


[click to expand]

The Wall Street bonus pool rose 17% and average bonus per person rose 25%.

Wall Street bonuses paid to New York City securities industry employees rose by 17 percent to $20.3 billion in 2009, according to an estimate released today by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Total compensation at the largest securities firms grew even faster and industry profits could exceed an unprecedented $55 billion in 2009, nearly three times greater than the previous all-time record. In 2008, the industry lost a record $42.6 billion.

On the surface this sounds like there will be a big jolt to the NYC regional economy. The sector is an important economic engine, providing 25% of the income from 5% of the jobs. Every job lost on Wall Street causes the loss of 2.5 private sector jobs.

The higher growth in bonuses are bittersweet – while the average per person bonus was up because there was job loss in the sector. Arguably few jobs lost than forecast but it tempers the bonus impact on the real estate economy.

But bonuses are controversial especially when so many are struggling outside of Wall Street. President Obama fell prey to populist sentiment with his “Fat Cats on Wall Street” comments but now doesn’t begrudge them (I’ve never been able to use begrudge in a sentence before).

Bonus income accounts for as much as 50% of total compensation for an individual.

But as John Mack, Morgan Stanley Chairman, has said

“I still don’t think the industry gets it,” Bloomberg reported the veteran banker as saying yesterday during an appearance in Charlotte, North Carolina (hat tip Huffington Post). “The issue is not structure, it is amount.”

My anecdotal feedback is that compensation seems to be about 70% restricted stock and 30% cash. And institutions like UBS are reportedly paying out half of the cash compensation now and half in 6 months.

That knocks the wind out of the “sales” (sorry) for a spring frenzy in the NYC housing market that has grown accustomed to a frenzy over the past decade. Still, it will help but I am skeptical about it helping above seasonal expectations, but who really knows.



[click to expand]
Source: New York State State Comptroller


Tags:


[The Housing Helix Podcast] Steven R. Wagner Esq., Wagner Davis, P.C.

February 22, 2010 | 6:00 am | | Podcasts |


I had a great discussion with Steve Wagner, an attorney who specializes in representing co-ops/condos, litigation and technology, among other areas. I have worked with his firm Wagner Davis, P.C. over the years on some crazy cases.

Steve has a wealth of knowledge, but don’t get him started on grandfathering in co-ops. Listen to find out why.

Check out the podcast

The Housing Helix Podcast Interview List

You can subscribe on iTunes or simply listen to the podcast on my other blog The Housing Helix.



[Interview] Steven R. Wagner Esq., Wagner Davis, P.C.

February 22, 2010 | 12:01 am | | Podcasts |

Read More


[RealtyTrac] 10% Drop In Foreclosures, Surge Expected Over Next Few Months

February 11, 2010 | 4:20 pm | |


[click to open]

RealtyTrac just released its monthly report covering January foreclosure activity.

  • 10% decrease in overall activity from the December surge
  • 15 percent above the level reported in January 2009

“January foreclosure numbers are exhibiting a pattern very similar to a year ago: a double-digit percentage jump in December foreclosure activity followed by a 10 percent drop in January,” said James J. Saccacio, chief executive officer of RealtyTrac “If history repeats itself we will see a surge in the numbers over the next few months as lenders foreclose on delinquent loans where neither the existing loan modification programs or the new short sale and deed-in-lieu of foreclosure alternatives works.”

The Sand States remain true to form (Nevada, Arizona, California, Florida)

  • Nevada’s foreclosure rate remained highest among the states for the 37th straight month. One in every 95 Nevada housing units received a foreclosure filing during the month — more than four times the national average.

    • Arizona’s foreclosure rate to second highest among the states in January. One in every 129 Arizona housing units received a foreclosure filing during the month.
    • Foreclosure activity decreased by double-digit percentages from the previous month in both California and Florida, and the two states registered nearly identical foreclosure rates — one in every 187 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing.
  • Six states account for nearly 60 percent of national total

  • Phoenix only top 10 metro area to post monthly foreclosure increase

In other words, the foreclosure rush in December to file by end of year, then subsequent lull in January do not suggest that the foreclosure problem is improving if seasonality has anything to say about it.

Tags: ,


Appraisers and Foreclosure Sales Bring Havoc to Housing Markets

January 29, 2010 | 12:30 am | | Articles |

I authored the following article for RealtyTrac which appeared on the cover of their November 2009 subscriber newsletter called Foreclosure News Report. It features a column for guest experts called “My Take.”

When Rick Sharga invited to write the article, he provided the previous issue which featured a great article by Karl Case of the Case Shiller Index and I was sold.

I hope you enjoy it.



Appraisers and Foreclosure Sales Bring Havoc to Housing Markets
By Jonathan Miller
President/CEO of Miller Samuel Inc.
11-2009

In many ways, the quality of appraisals has fallen as precipitously as many US housing markets over the past year. Just as the need for reliable asset valuation for mortgage lending and disposition has become critical (fewer data points and more distressed assets) the appraisal profession seems less equipped to handle it and users of their services seem more disconnected than ever.

The appraisal watershed moment was May 1, 2009, when the controversial agreement between Fannie Mae and New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, known as the Home Valuation Code of Conduct, became effective and the long neglected and misunderstood appraisal profession finally moved to the front burner. Adopted by federal housing agencies, HVCC, or lovingly referred to by the appraiserati as “Havoc” and has created just that.

During the 2003 to 2007 credit boom, a measure of the disconnect between risk and reward became evident by the proliferation of mortgage brokers in the residential lending process. Wholesale lending boomed over this period, becoming two thirds of the source of loan business for residential mortgage origination. Mortgage brokers were able to select the appraisers for the mortgages that they sent to banks.

Despite the fact that there are reputable mortgage brokers, this relationship is a fundamental flaw in the lending process since the mortgage broker is only paid when and if the loan closes. The same lack of separation existed and still exists between rating agencies and investment banks that aggressively sought out AAA ratings for their mortgage securitization products. Rating agencies acceded to their client’s wishes in the name of generating more revenue.

As evidence of the systemic defect, appraisers who were magically able to appraise a property high enough to make the deal work despite the market value of that locale, thrived in this environment. Lenders were in “don’t ask, don’t tell” mode and they could package and sell off those mortgages to investors who didn’t seem to care about the value of the mortgage collateral either. Banks closed their appraisal review departments nationwide which had served to buffer appraisers from the bank sales functions because appraisal departments were viewed as cost centers.

The residential appraisal profession evolved into an army of “form-fillers” and “deal-enablers” as the insular protection of appraisal professionals was removed. Appraisers were subjected to enormous direct and indirect pressure from bank loan officers and mortgage brokers for results. “No play, no pay” became the silent engine driving large volumes of business to the newly empowered valuation force. The modern residential appraiser became known as the “ten-percenter” because many appraisals reported values of ten percent more than the sales price or borrower’s estimated value. They did this to give the lender more flexibility and were rewarded with more business.

HVCC now prevents mortgage brokers from ordering appraisals for mortgages where the lender plans on selling them to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac which is a decidedly positive move towards protecting the neutrality of the appraiser. Most benefits of removing the mortgage broker from the appraisal process are lost because HVCC has enabled an unregulated institution known as appraisal management companies to push large volumes of appraisals on those who bid the lowest and turn around the reports the quickest. Stories about of out of market appraisers doing 10-12 assignments in 24 hours are increasingly common. How much market analysis is physical possible with that sort of volume?

After severing relationships with local appraisers by closing in-house appraisal departments and becoming dependent on mortgage brokers for the appraisal, banks have turned to AMC’s for the majority of their appraisal order volume for mortgage lending.

Appraisal management companies are the middlemen in the process, collecting the same or higher fee for an appraisal assignment and finding appraisers who will work for wages as low as half the prevailing market rate who need to complete assignments in one-fifth the typical turnaround time. You can see how this leads to the reduction in reliability.

The appraisal profession therefore remains an important component in the systemic breakdown of the mortgage lending process and is part of the reason why we are seeing 300,000 foreclosures per month.

The National Association of Realtors and The National Association of Home Builders were among the first organizations to notice the growing problem of “low appraisals”. The dramatic deterioration in appraisal quality swung the valuation bias from high to low. The low valuation bias does not refer to declining housing market conditions. Despite mortgage lending being an important part of their business, many banks aren’t thrilled to provide mortgages in declining housing markets with rising unemployment and looming losses in commercial real estate, auto loans, credit cards and others. Low valuations have essentially been encouraged by rewarding those very appraisers with more assignments. Think of the low bias in valuation as informal risk management. The caliber and condition of the appraisal environment had deteriorated so rapidly to the point where it may now be slowing the recovery of the housing market.

One of the criticisms of appraisers today is that they are using comparable sales commonly referred to as “comps” that include foreclosure sales. Are these sales an arm’s length transaction between a fully informed buyer and seller is problematic at best. While this is a valid concern, the problem often pertains to the actual or perceived condition of the foreclosure sales and their respective marketing times.

Often foreclosure properties are inferior in condition to non-foreclosure properties because of the financial distress of the prior owner. The property was likely in disrepair leading up to foreclosure and may contain hidden defects. Banks are managing the properties that they hold but only as a minimum by keeping them from deteriorating in condition.

In many cases, foreclosure sales are marketed more quickly than competing sales. The lender is not interested in being a landlord and wants to recoup the mortgage amount as soon as possible. Often referred to as quicksale value, foreclosure listings can be priced to sell faster than normal marketing times, typically in 60 to 90 days.

The idea that foreclosure sales are priced lower than non-foreclosure properties is usually confused with the disparity in condition and marketing times and those reasons therefore are thought to invalidate them for use as comps by appraisers.

Foreclosure sales can be used as comps but the issue is really more about how those comps are adjusted for their differing amenities.

If two listings in the same neighborhood are essentially identical in physical characteristics like square footage, style, number of bedrooms, and one is a foreclosure property, then the foreclosure listing price will often set the market for that type of property. In many cases, the lower price that foreclosure sales establish are a function of difference in condition or the fact that the bank wishes to sell faster than market conditions will normally allow.

A foreclosure listing competes with non-foreclosure sales and can impact the values of surrounding homes. This becomes a powerful factor in influencing housing trends. If large portion of a neighborhood is comprised of recent closed foreclosure sales and active foreclosure listings, then guess what? That’s the market.

Throw in a form-filler mentality enabled by HVCC and differences such as condition, marketing time, market concentration and trends are often not considered in the appraisal, resulting in inaccurate valuations. As a market phenomenon, the lower caliber of appraisers has unfairly restricted the flow of sales activity, impeding the housing recovery nationwide.

In response to the HVCC backlash, the House Financial Services Committee added an amendment to the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act HR 3126 on October 21st which among other things, wants all federal agencies to start accepting appraisals ordered through mortgage brokers in order to save the consumer money.

If this amendment is adopted by the US House of Representatives and US Senate and becomes law, its deja vu all over again. The Appraisal Institute, in their rightful obsession with getting rid of HVCC, has erred in viewing such an amendment as a victory for consumers. One of the reasons HVCC was established was in response to the problems created by the relationship between appraisers and mortgage brokers. Unfortunately, by solving one problem, it created other problems and returning to the ways of old is a giant step backwards.

We are in the midst of the greatest credit crunch since the Great Depression and yet few seem to understand the importance of neutral valuation of collateral so banks can make informed lending decisions. Appraisers need to be competent enough to make informed decisions about whether foreclosures sales are properly used comps. For the time being, many are not.


Tags: , , , , , ,


[Trulia] Rating Obama on Housing On Eve of State of Union Address

January 25, 2010 | 10:42 pm | |

Trulia, the real estate search site, has organized, and has asked me to participate in, an industry call Tuesday hosted by CEO and co-founder Pete Flint and Howard Glaser of The Glaser Group to discuss how the Obama administration has handled the housing crisis one year in (run-on sentence alert).

This will precede the President’s State of the Union address on Wednesday.

It should be interesting (the industry call, that is). I’ll post the results of the survey on Matrix and other feedback as soon as I can.

Disclosure: I’m an original member of the Trulia industry advisory panel.